Golden corporation quotes
The proposed rule would preclude independent financial statement auditors from performing „certain internal audit services.” The description of inappropriate activities included in your current proposal is so broad that it could restrict Enron from engaging its independent financial statement auditors to report on the company’s control processes on a recurring basis as the company has now arranged. I find this troubling, not only because I believe the independence and expertise of the independent auditors enhances this process, but also because Enron has found its „integrated audit” arrangement to be more efficient and cost-effective than the more traditional roles of separate internal and external auditing functions. Frankly, I fail to understand how extending the scope of what is independently audited can be anything but positive.
Kenneth Lay – CEO Enronu o oddzieleniu audytu wewnętrznego od zewnętrznego 2 lata przed skandalem księgowym Enronu (link).
Our job is to set a tone at the top to incent people to do the right thing and to set up safety nets to catch people who make mistakes or do the wrong thing and correct those as quickly as possible. And it is working. It is working.
Charles O. Prince III – CEO Citygrup o działaniu w radzie dyrektorów na rok przed stratą 47 miliardów na aktywach zabezpieczonych hipoteką (link).
We must not let regulatory reform and requirements create excessive bureaucracy and unnecessary permanent costs (…)
We tightly manage our risk in derivatives by limiting our risk to each counterparty, by limiting the type of risk we take within each counterparty and by taking substantial collateral against existing credit exposures. Today, our net credit exposure to all counterparties, net of collateral – in essence, what we are owed by our various counterparties – is approximately $70 billion. Most of our unsecured exposure is to government entities or corporate clients where we deliberately don’t ask for collateral, which essentially is a way to extend credit to them. With all of our major global market counterparties – think of all the other major financial institutions – we don’t leave any material unsecured derivatives exposure at all – we post collateral to each other every day. One other great fear about derivatives is their “lack of transparency.” If by “transparency” people mean transparent prices, derivatives actually are very transparent. Computer screens provide immediate pricing and very accurate spread information on the majority of derivatives, and many dealers can respond with actual bids, in size and with very tight spreads, to anyone who calls. If by “lack of transparency” people mean that the regulators cannot access the information they need to evaluate the risks, then that is incorrect – they can and do see everything we can see. Finally, if by “transparency” they mean that investors (our shareholders and debtholders) can’t see or understand the risks – that’s kind of true even though we make extensive disclosures. But you can look at any large company’s public disclosures, and there will be some, not deliberate, lack of transparency. For example, it’s not transparent what newspaper companies pay for print or paper or how various companies have their inventory marked or what insurance companies’ true exposures are. We try to be as transparent as we can meaningfully be, without overwhelming our investors. We welcome any suggestions on how we can get even better at this.
Jamie Dimon – CEO JP Morgan w liście do akcjonariuszy z 2012r na póltora miesiąca przed stratą
2 miliardów na derywatach (link pdf).